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THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION*
PARVEZ HASSAN**

The basic values presently demanded in the . . .International
Covenants on Human Rights... are formulated at ...high levels of
abstraction. . . .McDougal, Laswell & Chen, Human Rights and
World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63
Am. J. INT'L L. 237, 265 (1969).
I. THE

INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS: IM1PORTANCE OF INTERPRETATION

HE adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
hereinafter the Covenants,' by the United Nations in 1966 has been hailed as a
consummative endorsement of international concern over the rights of individuals.2 In elaborating both the earlier Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Covenants
are destined to have a significant influence on any future international human
rights efforts.3
It is therefore apparent that one of the most urgent tasks confronting
human rights advocates today is that of formulating and analyzing the standards prescribed in the Covenants. This task assumes added significance because of the several vague and ambiguous words used in the Covenants. For
example, articles 12(3), 14(1), 19(3), 21 and 22(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, hereinafter CP Covenant or Covenant, refer
to "ordre public"; the notion of "unreasonableness" is invoked in article 25;
and, further, in its articles 6, 9, 12, and 17, the CP Covenant speaks of "arbitrary." Any systematic study that attempts to give content to these words
would considerably aid international human rights efforts for several reasons.
First, it would define more precisely the international standards accepted in the
Covenants. Second, and this is a related factor, it will help decision-makers in
the implementation of the Covenants. Domestically, for example, it would guide
the national courts about the extent of a signatory state's obligations. At the
* This paper was delivered at the Bangkok World Conference on World Peace Through
Law, Sept. 10, 1969.
** B.A., Panjab, 1959; LL.B., Panjab, 1961; LL.M., Yale University, 1963; SJ.D.,
Harvard University, 1969; Member of the Pakistan Bar.
1. For text of the Covenants, see U.N. Doc., 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 49-60, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter, the United Nations materials are cited without the designation "U.N." or "U.N. Doc."); reprinted in UNITD NATIONS, HumAr RIGHTS: A ComPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UN'EnD NATIONS 3-18 (1967).

2. See, e.g., WoRn ASSEMBLY OF HUm" RIGHTS, MONTREAL STATEMENT (1968);
reprinted in 9 J. INT'L COMM. JURISTS 94-112 (No. 1, 1968).
3. Another equally important reason for the future potential of the Covenants is the

wider participation in their drafting and the greater unanimity in their adoption. With the
admission of new Afro-Asian members in the United Nations, 106 states joined to adopt the
Covenants unanimously whereas, in 1948, the Universal Declaration was adopted by a
vote of 48-0, with 8 abstentions.
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international level, the Human Rights Committee, envisaged by the Covenants
and the Optional Protocol to the Covenants, 4 would have to ascertain the
meaning of these words if the acts of a signatory state were challenged as inconsistent with the articles of the Covenants.
This paper suggests a methodology by which the provisions of the Covenants can be defined more precisely. This will be done by attempting to determine the meaning of the term "arbitrary" arrest in article 9 of the CP Covenant.
"Arbitrary" has been chosen from the vague words mentioned earlier, because
it is considered to be the most important word in the Covenants. As already
indicated, "arbitrary" is used in four articles of the CP Covenant and in as
many articles of the Universal DeclarationY In effect, the interpretation of these
articles dealing with such basic human rights as the rights to life, to be free
from arbitrary arrest and detention, to privacy, to property, to nationality, and
to enter one's own country largely hinge on the meaning of "arbitrary."
II.

"AaBiTRARY

ARREST" AND TH

PRINCIPLES oF TREATY INTERPRETATION

Article 9 of the CP Covenant provides
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be subjected to arbitraryarrest or detention. No one shall be
4. For a description of the implementation machinery of the Covenants, see Schwelb,
Civil and Political Rights: The International Measures of Implementation, 62 Am. J. INT'L
L. 827, 835-68 (1968); Capotorti, The International Measures of Implementation Included
in the Covenants on Human Rights, in INTEMATIONAL PROTECTION OF Hu-tm Rionr
131-48 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968); Starr, International Protection of Human Rights
and the United Nations Covenants, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 863, 873-83; and C. CHRISOLM, LAw
AND HmmAN RiGHTS 9-12 (1968).

5. The CP Covenant
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall
be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law.
Article 12
4. No one shall be arbitrarilydeprived of the right to enter his own
country.
Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.
The Universal Declaration
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitraryinterference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
Article 15
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied
the right to change his nationality.
Article 17
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
(Emphasis in all articles added.)
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deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law. (Emphasis added.)
Does "arbitrary" mean "illegal" or "unjust" or both? The importance of the distinction is highlighted by the fact that if "arbitrary" merely means "illegal," all
despotic acts and oppressive laws of a government would be unassailable so long
as these legislative enactments were in accordance with municipal laws. If
"arbitrary" is synonymous with "unjust" then governments would have to
respond to a higher standard. How then should a decision-maker go about
choosing between these conflicting meanings of the word "arbitrary"? What
are the tools he needs or the guidelines, if any, that he ought to follow?
Determining the meaning of the word "arbitrary" in article 9 relates,
essentially, to the procedures for interpreting international agreements. While
the interpretation of treaties is not an exact science, 6 there have evolved,
through the decisions of international courts and tribunals and the practice of
foreign offices, certain guidelines which aid the task of clarification. This is not
the place to examine the various canons of treaty interpretations, 7 because
there is a considerable difference of opinion regarding their relative importance
and hierarchical order.8 But basic to all goals of treaty interpretation is the
desire to give effect to the intention of the parties. 9 Factors generally conceded
as relevant to determine the meaning of terms employed in treaties include
1. the context of the treaty;
2. its objects and purposes;
3. its preparatory work;
6. See Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, in REPORT or THE
May 4-July
19, 1966, 21 GAOR, Supp. 9, at 20, 50 ff 4, A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966). Lord McNair confesses,
"there is no part of the law of treaties which the text-writer approaches with more trepidaINTERNATIONAL LAW CowmT SSION ON THE WORK OF ITS EIGHTEENTH SEssIoN,

tion than the question of interpretation." LoRD McNA.R, TnE LAw OF TREATIxs 364 (1961).

7. See generally, Draft Articles, supra note 6, at 49-56; LORD McNAIR, supra note 6,
at 364-489; M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL, and J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEifENTS AND WORLD PuBLIc ORDER (1967); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Proceddre of the
International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, in
28 BRIT. YEAR Boon INT'L L. 1-28 (1951), and in 33 BRIT. YEAR Booz INT'L L. 203-93
(1957) ; Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the
Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. YEAR BOOK INT'L L. 48-85 (1949); Gordon, The World
Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 Ae. J. INT'L L. 794-833 (1965).
8. See, e.g., statement of McDougal, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. (1968), and sources cited in
supra note 7.
9.

"The primary or initial goal of interpretation . . . stipulates that decision-makers

undertake a disciplined, responsible effort to ascertain the genuine shared expectations of
the particular parties to an agreement. The link with fundamental policy is clear: to defend
the dignity of man is to respect his choices and not, save for overriding common interest,
to impose the choices of others upon him." M. McDouAL et al., supra note 7, at 40-41.
"It is the intention of the authors . . . which is the starting-point and the goal of all
interpretation. It is the duty of the judge to resort to all available means . . . to discover
the intention of the parties. . . ." Lauterpacht, supra note 7, at 83. "The primary end of
treaty interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of the parties, and not frustrate
them." 1 D. O'CoNNELL, INTERNA oNAr LAw 271 (1965). The only possible exception is

the extreme teleological school of thought which professes to ignore intentions as such, and
looks only to the apparent objects and purposes of the treaty. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, 1957
Article, supra note 7, at 204, 207-09.

37
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4. the circumstances of its conclusion;
5. the special meaning to be given to a term if the parties intended such a
term to have a special meaning;
6. any instrument made by one or more parties in connectioll. with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty;
7. any subsequent practice which establishes the common understanding
of the meaning of the terms as between the parties generally;
8. any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 10
Of these eight guidelines, seven are discussed in this section. The eighth,
concerning rules of international law, is dealt with in section C, Conclusions
and Recommendations.
A. The Context
"Interpretation starts, as it must, with a careful consideration of the text
to be interpreted. This is so because the text is the expression of the will and
intention of the parties. To elucidate its meaning, therefore, is ex hypothesi, to
give effect to that will and intention."'1
Considering the text of article 9 as a whole, it is possible to construe
"arbitrary" as both "unlawful" and as imposing extra-legal obligations. Notice,
for example, the interchangeable use of the words "arbitrary" and "unlawful"
in the article:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedures as are established by. law.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and
order his release if the detention is not lawful.
10. See arts. 27 and 28 adopted by the 1968 Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,
in United Nations Law of Treaties Conference: Articles Adopted by Committee of the
Whole [First Sess., Mar. 26-May 24, 1968], 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAS 770, 784-85 (1968).
These articles, recommended earlier by the International Law Commission, Draft Articles,
supra note 6, at 14, 49-54, reflect recent international attempts to codify the principles of
interpretation. The United States has persuasively argued that the hierarchical distinction
between "primary" and "supplementary" means of interpretation created by arts. 27 and
28 is overly rigid and unnecessarily restrictive. See Draft Articles, supra note 6, at 182-83,
and 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 1021-27 (1967). The guidelines in the text are based on the U.S.
proposed amendment, A/CoNP-39/C.1/L.156, reprinted in 62 Ams. J. INT'L L. 1021 (1968).
The order in which they are stated has no significaucerespecting the relative weight to be
given to each of them.
11. Fitzmaurice, 1957 Article, supra note 7, at 207. See also, Draft Articles, supra note

6, at 51-52, ff 11.
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5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful12arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
The restrictive-that is the "unlawful"-interpretation of "arbitrary" is
aided by the third sentence in the first paragraph which refers to "except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."
It is further helped by the language of paragraph 4 under which a person who
has been deprived of his liberty can have the "lawfulness" of his detention
judged in a court. Similarly paragraph 5 asserts the enforceable right to compensation for victims of "unlawful" arrest.
But the reasons for interpreting "arbitrary" broadly are more persuasive.
First, the "plain, natural or ordinary" meaning of "arbitrary" is not "unlawful."' 8 Thus, if the intention was merely to provide for arrest and detention
"only in cases provided by law," the draftsmen would have either used the word
"unlawful" instead of "arbitrary" (indeed, when confronted with the choice,
they used the latter word), or deleted the second sentence on "arbitrary arrest,"
which, if "arbitrary" is interpreted to mean "unlawful," is redundant in view
of the third sentence.
Second, the distinction between "arbitrary" and "unlawful" is supported
by the other provisions of the Covenant. Most significantly, article 17 refers
to "arbitrary or unlawful interference." Furthermore, the interchangeable use of
"arbitrary" and "unlawful" in various articles reveals a deliberate pattern of
distinction in their meaning. The Covenant adopts different methods to indicate
the scope of the rights dealt with in its articles. "Law" is the final arbiter in
articles 13 and 20. "Reasonableness" is the test of the restrictions under article
25. Articles 12(3), 19(3), 21 and 22(2) attempt to define the permissible
restrictions (e.g., national security, public order, public health or morals) "provided by law." Articles 6, 9, 12(4) and 17 invoke the standard of "nonarbitrariness." While the vicissitudes of the drafting process (discussed below)
may partly explain this difference in approach, the intended variance in emphasis is unmistakable.
Third, the cumulative effect of the provisions of articles 9 and 10 is the
prescription of certain standards with which all "laws" on arrest and detention
must comply. Thus the declaration of the "right to liberty and security of
person" is followed by the requirements
(a) arrest and detention should be on grounds and in accordance
with procedures established by law,
(b) communication of reasons of arrest at the time of arrest,
12. Emphasis added in all sections. Paragraphs 2 and 3 cover certain important procedural rights but do -1iot involve the words "arbitrary" or "unlawful."
13. A typical definition of "arbitrary" includes: (1) subject to individual will or judgment without restriction; contingent solely upon one's discretion; (2) decided by a judge
or arbiter rather than by a law or statute;. (3) using or abusing unlimited power; uncontrolled or unrestricted by law; despotic, tyrannical; (4) capricious; -unreasonable; unsupported. THE IEANDOm. HousE DIcTIoNARY op THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 76 (1967).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

prompt production before judicial authorities,
trial within a reasonable time,
prompt communication of charges,
period of detention should be reasonable,
bail,
habeas corpus,
enforceable right to compensation for unlawful arrest, and
humane and proper treatment of those under detention.

All these combine to form a criminal jurisprudence based on the rule of law and
principles of justice.
Finally, it can be argued that the opening sentence "everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person" in paragraph 1 of article 9 controls the
other provisions of that paragraph. Thus the laws referred to in the third
sentence must not be inconsistent with everyone's right to liberty and security
of person. This argument is complemented by the general provisions of articles 2
and 5 of the Covenant. Article 2 contains the undertaking of all States parties
to the Covenant to adopt such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to
the rights recognized in the Covenant. Thus the laws in the third sentence of
paragraph 1 would be the same as those which States undertake to provide
under article 2, which according to the first sentence of paragraph 1 of article 9
must give effect to the right to liberty and security of person. Moreover, article
5 forbids State parties to take any action aimed at the destruction of the rights
recognized in the Covenant. This would proscribe any action by States which
would violate the right to'liberty and security of person provided in the opening
sentence of article 914
B. Objects and Purposes
The idea of an international bill of human rights was conceived mostly as a
reaction against the totalitarianism in pre-1945 Europe. From the very beginning15 of the drafting of the Covenant to the very end, 16 the draftsmen dedicated their efforts to the protection of the rights of individuals against
unwarranted encroachments by governments. The choice of their terms in the
Covenant must be interpreted in light of this over-all dedication.
The preamble of the Covenant reflects the underlying philosophy behind
the Covenant. It proclaims that the Covenant furthers the objectives of the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Moreover it recognizes the "inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family ... [as] the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace .... 17
14. See remarks of Morozov (U.S.S.R.), 13 GAOR, Third Comm. 138, 139 (1958).
15. See opening statement of Laugier, in E/CN.4/SR.1, at 1-3 (1947).
16. See 21 GAOR, Third Comm. 449-50, 476-87 (1966); 21 GA Prov. Rec. A/PV. 1495,
at 26-35, 38-77; A/PV. 1496, at 2-67 (1966).
17. Emphasis added.
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C. The PreparatoryWork
"It would hardly be an exaggeration" declares Lord McNair "to say that
in almost every case involving the interpretation of a treaty one or both of the
parties seeks to invoke the preparatory work." 18 The word "arbitrary" figured
prominently in the drafting of the Covenant. From the study of its incorporation
in various articles-articles 6, 9, 12, 17 and the proposed article on property' 920
several conclusions can be asserted with different degrees of emphasis.
Perhaps the firmest conclusion is that the draftsmen did not equate "arbitrary" with "unlawful." Another firm conclusion is that the word "arbitrary"
was intended to invoke a standard of "justness" and "reasonableness"-that it
was expected to protect individuals against governmental tyranny and despoo
tism. The majority sentiment may well be summed up:
[Arbitrary] was a safeguard against the injustices of States, because
it applied not only to laws but also to statutory regulation and to all
acts performed by the executive. An arbitrary act was any act which
violated justice, reason or legislation, or was done according to someone's will or discretion, or which was capricious, despotic, imperious,
tyrannical or uncontrolled. 21
Beyond this, the preparatory work of the Covenant is less helpful. It is not
possible to develop from it a more precise definition of "arbitrary" nor is it
possible to deduce any defined standards of "justness" or "reasonableness."
Certain indicators of how some draftsmen visualized the interpretation of
"arbitrary" can, hovever, be suggested as, at best, mere "soft" conclusions.
Quite often, the phrase "due process of law" was injected in the discussion but
it would soon be discovered that its meaning was not well understood among
the majority of the draftsmen. Its peculiarity to the United States and the
American-influenced legal systems hindered its general acceptability. Another
differently expressed expectation was that "arbitrary" could be interpreted by
reference to national Constitutions and generally accepted principles of law.
Still another variant was the hope that world public opinion and the future
growth of jurisprudence on the subject could determine what was, and what
22
was not, arbitrary.
18. LoRD MeNAIR, supra note 6, at 412. He also points out that "the ...review of the
practice indicates that no litigant before an international tribunal can afford to ignore the
preparatory work of a treaty, but that he would probably err in making it a main plank
in his argument." Id. at 422.
19. An examination of the travaux priparatoires of these articles has been undertaken
at some length in Chapters I and IV of P. Hassan, Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and
Detention as a Human Right, 1969 (S.J.D. Thesis at Harvard Law School).
20. The following distinction between "firm" and "soft" conclusions is based on a
dichotomy that Professor Richard Baxter makes between "hard" and "soft" law in his
course on "Public International Law" given at Harvard Law School. Our distinction reflects
the degree of consensus among the draftsmen.
21. Report of the Third Committee, A/4045 (Dec. 9, 1958), 13 GAOR, Annexes,
Agenda Item 32, at 7, ff 49 (1958-59).
22. See, e.g., statements of Mrs. Roosevelt, E/CN.4/SR.139, at 4; SR.140, at 14 (Apr.
6-71 1950); Chang (China), E/CNA/SR.139, at 12, 13; EI-Farra (Syria), 12 GAOR, Third
Comm. 271 (1957).
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D. The Circumstances of Drafting
If further specificity cannot be derived from the preparatory work, it is
largely due to the numerous difficulties which inhere in most multilateral drafting processes. The magnitude of the challenge involved in synthesizing standards
of human rights acceptable to the general community of nations scarcely needs
elaboration. Different ideologies, cultures and legal systems were represented in
the drafting; conflicting viewpoints had to be reconciled and compromises made.
To this initial diversity must be added continual changes in the forum of
drafting and, on many occasions, in the identity of the draftsmen. Thus within
the United Nations alone, 23 the Covenant was discussed in numerous organs
and their committees and sub-committees: the "nuclear" Commission on
Human Rights, the Commission on Human Rights (plenary, Drafting Committee, Working Party on the Convention, special drafting sub-committees), the
Economic & Social Council (plenary, Social Committee), and the General
Assembly (plenary, Third Committee). The composition of some of these
bodies was ever expanding. Thus the doubling of the United Nations membership during the two-decades of the drafting period emphasized the need for
continual reassessment by the "new" members of the work so far accomplished.
Sometimes the same country would change its emphasis and position on some
issues. Part of this can be explained in the context of the unusually protracted
period of drafting; changes of governments and contemporary national legal
experiences inevitably continued to affect national attitudes during this period.
Another reason for some apparent contradictions in a country's position could
perhaps be found in the "changes of guards" among its representatives in the
drafting bodies. No two representatives, even though receiving instructions
from the same government, could be expected to take identical positions on
many issues. 24
Considering the complexity of the task and the conditioning factors of
the drafting process, one can better appreciate some of the questions left unanswered by the travaux. The lack of the desired specificity notwithstanding,
the draftsmen acquitted themselves remarkably well. They unequivocally and
abundantly emphasized their concern for the rights of individuals. Their choice
of the word "arbitrary" over "unlawful" adequately reflects their intended
emphasis. The Covenant, on the whole, has been hailed as a "good" document.25
23. Outside the United Nations bodies, the Covenant was subjected to the scrutiny of
governments, specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations and scholars.
24. It is a well known fact that many national representatives to the United Nations
bodies shape rather than implement a previously decided policy. This is especially so in "nonpolitical" controversies. The chances of shaping rather than merely following a policy, of
course, vary from case to case. Generally speaking it could be said that the determining
factor here would be the individual stature of the particular representative. Some countries,
particularly the developing ones, do not have adequately trained regular staffs in their
foreign offices. Without any effective guidelines in such cases, it would be easy for an eminently qualified representative to assert his "personal" viewpoints. An equally qualified
successor would also have no guidelines, and he might feel free to stress a different position.
25. Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in Eon-
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Undoubtedly, the draftsmen must have hoped that in interpreting it, future
decision-makers would take into account the many handicaps of a drafting
effort in which so many States and persons took part.
E. Special Meaning
Professor McDougal has persuasively demonstrated the relevance of the
travaux priparatoiresto determine whether or not the draftsmen intended to
give certain words "special meanings." 2 6 An examination of the travaux of the
Covenant reveals that through their extended discussion of the word "arbitrary," the draftsmen intended to give this term a special meaning. What this
meaning is has been noted in the preceding section on "The Preparatory Work."
F. Related Instrument
Elsewhere 2 we have established that the draftsmen of the Covenant
treated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a "related instrument."
Therein, we have also shown that the interpretation of the 'word "arbitrary"
in the Covenant involves its interpretation in articles 9, 12, 15, and 17 of the
Universal Declaration. A study of the inclusion of "arbitrary" in these articles
of the Declaration reinforces our conclusions about the intended meaning of that
term in the Covenant.
G. Subsequent Interpretation and Practice
Although the Covenant was adopted in 1966, article 9 was finally drafted
by the Third Committee in 1958. The most important "subsequent interpretation" of the word "arbitrary" in article 9 is the understanding on which thi .
word was included in article 12, adopted by the Third Committee in 1959, and
in article 17, adopted in 1960. That understanding, discussed elsewhere, 28 supports the distinction between "illegal" and "arbitrary."
Furthermore, a United Nations Committee on the Study of the Right of
Everyone to be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile appointed by
the Commission on Human Rights concludes that
while an illegal arrest or detention is almost always arbitrary, an arrest
or detention which is in accordance with law may nevertheless be
arbitrary.29
TEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE,
NATIONS AND HUI.AN RIGHTS 39, 120 (1968). "Whatever the failing in some

sions may be

. .

. it is a noteworthy achievement...

.'

Tnz

UNITED

of the provi-

Schwelb, Some Aspects of the InterINTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF

national Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966, in
Hum.iAN RIGHTS 103, 123 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968).
26. See 62 Am!. J. INT'L L. 1021, 1026 (1968).

27. See Hassan, The Word "Arbitrary" as Used in the Universal Declarationof Human
Rights: "Illegal" or "Unjust"? 10 HRmV. INT'L LJ. 225-62 (1969).
28.
29.
ARREST,

See Chapter IV of Hassan, supra note 19.
UNTED NATIONS, STUDY OF THE RIGHT OF
DETENTION AND EXILE 7 (1964).

EVERYONE TO BE FREE

FROm

ARBITRARY
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Accordingly, the Committee adopted the following definition of "arbitrary":
an arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on grounds or in accordance with procedures other than those established by law, or
(b) under the provisions of a law the purpose of which is incompatible
with respect for the right to liberty and security of person.80
While the conclusions of the Committee presently await the consideration
8 2
of the Commission, 1 the comments received from over forty-five governments
suggest that this definition of "arbitrary" will be substantially accepted. 88
The definition of "arbitrary arrest" was also undertaken at two United
Nations Seminars on the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and
Procedure." Both seminars recognized the possibility of a "legal" but "arbitrary" arrest. For example, the Baguio Seminar adopted the following definitions:
"Illegal arrest"-curtailment, not authorized by law, either statutory
or customary, of an individual's freedom of movement.
"Arbitrary arrest'--an arrest authorized by a law which fails adequately to protect human rights because either (a) the legal right to
arrest has been too widely defined, or (b) the means, circumstances or
physical force attendant on the arrest exceed the reasonable requirements of effecting arrest. 35
Finally, inasmuch as the Declaration and the Covenant are part of one
International Bill of Rights, the "subsequent interpretation and practice" concerning the words "arbitrary" and "arbitrarily" in the Declaration anticipate
the future practice under article 9 of the Covenant. The practice relating to the
articles of the Declaration points to a broad interpretation of "arbitrary."8 0
30. Id. This definition of "arbitrary" is also included in art. 1 of the Committee's
proposed Draft Principles on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, id. at 205.
31. U.N. Press Release, HR/291, at 13 (Mar. 24, 1969). See also Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Twenty-Fourth Session, 44 ESCOR, Supp. 4 (E/4475), No.
19, at 6, 8, and 143 (1968); UNiTD NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND Humrx RIGHTS
21 (1968).
32. See generally E/CN.4/835, Add.1-11 (Jan. 2, 1963-Apr. 20, 1966).
33. Most of the replies of governments cited in supra note 32 accepted explictly or
implicitly the Committee's definition of "arbitrary" in art. I of the Draft Principles. A handful of them objected to it on the ground that it left unanswered the question as to how and
by which authority laws will be determined as "incompatible with respect for the right to
liberty and security of person." See, e.g., the replies of France, E/CN.4/835, at 27; Spain,
id. at 51. See also the replies of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, id. at 66, and
Malaysia, id. Add. 9, at 11. Yugoslavia suggested that the definition might become more
concise and clear if it invoked the standards of the Universal Declaration, id. Add. 4, at 1.
34. These were held in Baguio City (Philippines), ST/TAA/HR/2 (Feb. 1958) and in
Santiago (Chile), ST/TAA/HR/3 (May, 1958). Although both seminars preceded by a few
months the adoption of article 9 by the Third Committee, they were held subsequent to the
adoption of that article by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights which, in fact,
is the original author of article 9.
35. See ST/TAA/HR/2, at 9. See also the Santiago Seminar, ST/TAA/HR/3, at 16.
36. For a full discussion, see Hassan, supra note 27 at 259-62.
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III.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

About twelve years ago, when the word "arbitrary" was first discussed
extensively by the Third Committee in connection with its drafting of the
Covenant, EI-Farra (Syria) pointed out,
[E]ven if the term "arbitrarily" had not yet been defined accurately,
for as
it would without a doubt quickly acquire a specific meaning,
37
society progressed the law developed to meet new needs.
Today, El-Farra's prophecy appears well on its way to realization. In the
intervening period, the uncertainty around "arbitrary" being synonymous with
"illegal" has rested. Over some twenty years, "arbitrary" has acquired a "special
meaning" in the international instruments on human rights adopted by the
United Nations. It has developed to mean "illegal and unjust."
Contrary to some thinking,3 8 we do not believe that the task of determining "standards" of justice is an impossible one. We recommend to decisionmakers the relevance of the general principles of law recognized in the principal
legal systems. As a first step, we suggest the ten principles noted earlier39 that
the Covenant itself accepts as essential to the right of everyone to be free from

arbitrary arrest and detention.
For support and elaboration of the ten principles, the decision-maker
could further look to the notion of wrongful arrest and detention in other

areas. 40 First, there is the area of State Responsibility. The laws of human
rights and those of State Responsibility are mutually reinforcing. Thus, while
37. 12 GAOR, Third Comm. 271 (1957).
38. See, e.g., the reply of the French Government cited in supra note 33.
39. See pp. 12-13 supra. See also the Draft Principles cited in supra note 30; Commission on Human Rights, Study of the Right of Arrested Persons to Communicate With
Those Whom it is Necessary for them to Consult in Order to Ensure their Defence or to
Protect their Essential Interests, E/CN.4/996 (Jan. 23, 1969).
The ten principles concerning freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention are related
to, but yet distinguishable from, provisions on fair trial dealt with in article 14 of the
Covenant. A comparable provision on "fair trial" is article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. See generally Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings
as a Human Right, 16 INT'L & Co rr. L.Q. 352-78 (1967). However, there is a tendency
to subsume the provisions on "arrest and detention" and "fair trial" under the general
rubric of the rights of the accused or of "due process." See, e.g., Morrisson, The Rights of the
Accused Under the United States Constitution and the European Human Rights Convention,
1968 Wis. L. Rnv. 192; Buergenthal, Comparative Study of Certain Due Process Requirements of the European Human Rights Convention, 16 BurFrAo L. R.v. 18-54 (1966-67).
40. Art. 38 of the SrATvrE or Tz INTERNAzoNALz CoURT or JusTicE recognizes the following "sources and subsidiary means" of international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
A study of the concept of "arbitrary arrest and detention" in the light of these "sources"
could well be the subject of another paper. We will, therefore, merely highlight some of
the guidelines that the decision-maker could turn to for interpreting "arbitrary arrest" in
article 9 of the Covenant.
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scholars of State Responsibility invoke human rights standards, 41 those trying
to elaborate the human rights prescriptions in the Covenant refer to the reservoir of the practice concerning State Responsibility. 42 The Harvard Convention
on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961) ,4
and Garcia-Amador's Revised Draft on International Responsibility of the State
44
for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens (1961)
are the most recent and comprehensive attempts to codify the law on the subject. 45 Article 5 of the Harvard Convention4 6 and article 4 of the GarciaAmador Revised Draft deal with arrest and detention and should therefore merit
special attention.47
Concerning international standards to be found in treaties, the two regional
Conventions on Human Rights are particularly significant.4 8 As Baxter has
remarked about the European Convention,

[It] furnishes evidence of the common standard prevailing in the
legal systems of the parties. But more than this, it indicates what
standard as to the treatment of nationals a State has been willing to
accept for international purposes. In this aspect, a treaty to which
fifteen States are parties is more compelling evidence of an international standard than the municipal statutes and constitutional provisions that the same49number of States are willing to apply for purely
municipal purposes.
41. See, e.g., C. AmERASINGRE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 278-81
(1967); Garcia-Amador, [First] Report on State Responsibility, [1956] 2 Y.B. IN'TL L.
Co~in'N 173 (A/CN.4/96), at 202-03; Second Report [1957] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COmMrN 104
(A/CN.4/106), at 112-16. See also L. Sohn & R. Baxter, CONVENTjoN ON THE INTERNATIONAL
REsPONsIBILITY oF STATES FOR INJURIES To ALIENS 59 (Draft No. 12, Harvard Law School,
1961).
42. See, e.g., Cheng, The Contribution of International Courts and Tribunals to the
Protection of Human Rights under Customary InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HumaAn RIGHTS 167-75 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968).
43. See supra note 41.
44. [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Comx' 46 (A/CN.4/134/Add.1).
45. Concerning future prospects of codifying the law of State Responsibility, see
generally Baxter, Reflections on Codification in Light of the International Law of State
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 16 SYRAcusE L. REv. 745-61 (1965).
46. The writer is grateful to Professors Sohn and Baxter for allowing consultations
with their preparatory work on this article.
47. Comprehensive presentation of the "case law" concerning international responsibility
for wrongful arrest and detention is available in A. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL oF JUSTICE 196-214, 549 (1938); 8 M. WHXITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 863-85 (1967); 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-418 (1937); V. G. HAcKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAWv 597-610
(1943); V. J. MooRE, A DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAW 765-86 (1906). See also the U.N.
Secretariat, Digest of the Decisions of International Tribunals Relating to State Responsibility, [1964] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoM'N 132 (A/CN.4/169), at 149-50; Supplement to the
Digest, (A/CN.4/208), at 12 (Feb. 3, 1969).
48. For the role of the European Convention and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in the regional promotion and protection of human rights, see generally
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, REPORT . . . TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HuMAN RIGHTS,
1968 (1967); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Organization of
American States to the International Conference on Human Rights, 1968, OASOR, OEA/Ser.
L/V/1.5 (Dec. 18, 1967). (OASOR refers to Organization of American States Official
Records.)
49. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41
BRIT. YEAR Boox INT'L L. 275, 297-98 (1965-66).
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Article 5 of the European Convention"° deals with arrest and detention.
Through decisions of the European Commission and the European Court of
Human Rights concerning this article, the concept of freedom from arbitrary
arrest and detention has assumed new dimensions. 51
In the Americas, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has so
far5 2 rested its efforts to protect individual liberties on articles I and XXV of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man which provide:
Article I. Every human being has the right to life, liberty and
the security of his person.
Article XXV. No person may be deprived of his liberty except
in the cases and according to the procedures established by preexisting
law.
No person may be deprived of liberty for nonfulfillment of obligations of a purely civil character.
Every individual who has been deprived of his liberty has the
right to have the legality of his detention ascertained without delay
by a court, and the right to be tried without undue delay or, otherwise,
to be released. He also
has the right to humane treatment during the
53
time he is in custody.
54
Presently, a Draft Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights
awaits action at the forthcoming Inter-American Specialized Conference. 55 If
adopted, its article 6 will supplement article 9 of the Covenant at the regional
level.
Bilateral treaties can also provide good evidence of community expectations." Modern treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation and consular
conventions increasingly contain elaborate provisions on the protection against
wrongful arrest and detention of the nationals of the signatory States.57 Fur-

50. 213 U.N.T.S. 221
51. See CouNcIL or EuRoPE, REPORT, supra note 48, at 13-16; Buergenthal, Comparison

of the Jurisprudence of National Courts with that of the Organs of the Convention as
Regards the Rights of the Individual in Court Proceedings, in HumA RIGHTS nr NATIONAL
AND INTEmRATiONAL LAW 151, 151-70, 198-200 (A. Robertson ed. 1968); CoUNcIL or EUROPE,
EUROPEAN COURT or HUMa_
RIGHTS: "NEumMhEISTER" CASE JUDG1MENT (June 27, 1968);
"WEInMorr" CASE JUDGMENT (June 27, 1968).
52. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Activities
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Republic (June 1 to
August 31, 1965), OASOR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.13, Doc. 14, Rev., at 52-60 (Oct. 15, 1965);
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of Political Prisoners
and their Relatives in Cuba, OASOR., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.7, Doc. 4, at 11-64 (May 17, 1963).
53. Pan American Union, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Basic Documents, OASOR, OEA/Ser.L/V/1.4, at 1, 2, 6 (Dec. 1, 1960).
54. OASOR, OEA/Ser.G/V, C-d-1631 (Oct. 2, 1968).
55. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Work of the Organization of American States in the Field of Human Rights in the Year 1968, OASOR, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.20,
Doc. 31, at 1-2 (Jan. 6, 1969) is the most recent published announcement of the status of
the Draft Inter-American Convention. Observations of some governments on this Draft
include OASOR, OEA/Ser.G/VI,C/NF-1081 and Add.l-4 (Jan. 3-Feb. 26, 1969).
56. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. 4, 22-23
wherein the Court considered some provisions of the Bancroft Treaties as evidence of the
law. Cf. Baxter, supra note 45, at 757.
57. See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 Mn n.
L. REV. 805, 822-23 (1958). 57 A.m. J. INT'L L. 411-18 (1963) contains a list of "arrest"
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thermore, some of the ten principles find support in article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.5 8
Yet another form of treaty that synthesizes international standards is the
Status of Forces (SOF) Agreement. The pioneering example of article VII(9)
of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 9 has led to similarly detailed provisions concerning some of the ten principles in United States SOF Agreements
with, for example, Australia,6" Barbados, 61 Iceland,62 Japan63 Libya, 4 Nicprovisions in bilateral treaties between the United States and other countries. Citations to
such provisions may also be found in 8 M. WannTrzA, su pra note 47, at 721-22. Article III
of the United States-Pakistan Treaty of Friendship and Commerce is typical of these
provisions:
1. Nationals of either Party within the territories of the other Party shall be
free from molestations of every kind, and shall receive the most constant protection
and security, in no case less than that required by international law.
2. If, within the territories of either Party, a national of the other Party is
taken into custody, the nearest consular representative of his country shall on the
demand of such national be immediately notified and shall have the right to visit
and communicate with such national. Such national shall (a) receive reasonable and
humane treatment; (b) be formally and immediately informed of the accusations
against him; (c) be brought to trial with all convenient speed, with due consideration to the proper preparation of his defense; and (d) enjoy all means reasonably
necessary to his defense, including the services of competent counsel of his choice.
(404 U.N.T.S. 259; 12 U.S.T. 110; T.I.A.S. 4683).
58.

H UNITED NATIOws, CONPERENCE ON CoNsULAR RELATIONS,

O'IcIAr. RECORDS

(A/Couv.25/16/Add.1), at 175, 181 (1963). See also arts. 41 and 42, id. at 182, concerning
arrest and detention of Consuls. A recent discussion of arts. 36, 41-42 may be found in
Lee, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in P. CAIaR & L. LEE, VIENNA CoNvENTIoNs
ON DrmomTIc AND CoNsuLAR RELATIxNS 41, 63-66 (1969).
59. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made
against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are
within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free
or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time
being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter;
and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State
and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present
at his trial. (199 U.N.T.S. 67; 4 U.S.T. 1792; T.I.A.S. 2846).
See generally R. ELLERT, NATO "FAIR TRIAL" SFEOUARDS (1963). Note the statement of
the U.S. Attorney General Brownell cited id. at 22 to the effect that the procedural safeguards provided by art. VII(9) are in accordance with "civilized standards of justice."
60. Art. 8(9) of the Agreement Concerning the Status of United States Forces in
Australia, entered into force May 9, 1963, 496 U.N.T.S. 55; 14 U.S.T. 506; T.I.A.S. 5349.
See also the U.S.-Australian Exchange of Notes Concerning Weather Stations in Nauru
Island, entered into force Feb. 25, 1958, 317 U.N.T.S. 153; 9 U.S.T. 266; T.I.A.S. 4001.
61. Art. IX(9) of the Agreement Concerning United States Defense Areas in the
Federation of the West Indies, entered into force Feb. 10, 1961, 409 U.N.T.S. 67; 12 U.S.T.
408; T.IA.S. 4734. This Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies was terminated
with respect to Jamaica, U.S. DEPARTMENT or STATE, TEEATIES [T FORCE 117 (1968), but

is still in effect with respect to Barbados, id. at 13; and Trinidad and Tobago, id. at 205.
62. Art. 2(9) of the Annex on the Status of United States Personnel and Property,
entered into force May 8, 1951, 205 U.N.T.S. 180; 2 U.S.T. 1533; T.IJA.S. 2295.
63. Art. XVII(9) of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, entered into force June 23, 1960, 373 U.N.T.S. 248, 277; 11 U.S.T.
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aragua,0 5 Pakistan, 66 and Trinidad and Tobago. 67 On the basis of the "so far
workable and satisfactory" 68 experience of the United States with these Agreements, one can safely venture the suggestion that more and more SOF Agreements will incorporate procedural safeguards on the arrest and detention of
visiting armed forces. 69
In another sphere, a United Nations Committee has recently prepared
about ninety "Country Monographs" on national laws and practices concerning
arrest and detention.70 On the basis of a comprehensive comparative study of
72
71
this national practice, the Committee has proposed certain Draft Principles
which attempt to "codify" in more details than article 9 of the Covenant the
international standards of the right against arbitrary arrest and detention.

Finally, the "most highly qualified publicists" have regarded the ten
principles as basic to human dignity. Hersch Lauterpacht, for instance, indicated this priority by including the following provisions as article 1 of his
Draft International Bill of the Rights of Man:
The ... liberty of the person shall be inviolate within the limits
of the law.
No person shall be deprived of liberty save by a judgment of a
court of law or pending trial in accordance with the law. Detention by
purely executive order shall be unlawful in time of peace.
There shall be protection from and compensation for arbitrary
and unauthorised arrest and detention.
The law shall provide safeguards against prolonged detention
preceding trial, against excessive bail or unreasonable refusal thereof,
against denial of just guarantees in respect of evidence and procedure
1652, 1666; T.I.A.S. 4510. For similar provisions in an earlier treaty with Japan, see amended
art. XVII(9) of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the [1952] Security
Treaty, entered into force Oct. 29, 1953, T.IA.S. 2848. See also art. XVI(9) of the Agreement with Japan Concerning the Status of U.N. Forces in Japan, entered into force June 11,
1954, T.I.A.S. 2995.
64. Art. XX(5) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, entered into force Oct.
30, 1954, 224 U.N.T.S. 217; 5 U.S.T. 2449, 2468; T.I.A.S. 3107.
65. Art. IX(9) of the Agreement Concerning the Establishment of Loran Transmitting
Station, entered into force Sept. 5, 1958, 336 U.N.T.S. 33, 41; 9 U.S.T. 1206, 1210; T.I.A.S.
4106.
66. See Annex B(9) and Exchange of Notes Concerning the Establishment of Communications Unit in Pakistan, entered into force July 18, 1959, 355 U.N.T.S. 367; 10 U.S.T.
1366, 1377; T.I.A.S. 4281. [Note the additional provision regarding "cruel or unusual
punishment" in the Exchange of Notes.]
67. See supra note 61.
68. Haughney, Developments in Status of Forces Agreements, 3 INT'L LAwYER 560
(1969).
69. The U.S. is currently negotiating an SOF Agreement with Thailand, id.at 561, and
it would be interesting to see if provisions of art. VII(9) of the NATO SOF Agreement
will be substantially retained.
70. U.N. STUDY, supra note 29, at 4-5, 218-19. See also the statements of fifty-six
governments concerning the enjoyment in their countries of the right against arbitrary
arrest and detention, U=Dro NATioNs, YEABoox ON HumAN RiGHTS, F.Rr SUPPLmaNTARY VOLUME: FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION AND ExmE (1959).
71.

See generally U.N. SrTuY, supra note 29.

72. Id. at 205-17. The Draft Principles presently await consideration by the Commission on Human Rights.
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in criminal cases, against the refusal of protection in the nature of
the writ of habeas corpus ...and against punishment which is cruel,
inhuman, or offensive to the dignity of man.73
In fact, so widespread is the acceptance of the ten principles that writers have
74
zealously included them in the "minimum standard of international justice.,
By reference to the writings of these publicists and to the other sources mentioned earlier, it should be possible to elaborate the obligations imposed by the
term "arbitrary" in article 9 of the Covenant.
This paper has attempted to point out the importance of clarifying
with precision certain fundamental terms in the Covenants. It would well
serve international and national human rights efforts if similar studies of
the other vague terms such as "ordre public" and "reasonableness" were
undertaken.
73. H. LAUTERPAcHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUmdAN RIGHTS 313, 327 (1950). Over
the years, several U.N. Seminars on Human Rights have brought together leading scholars,
judges and lawyers from all over the world. Significantly, consensus on the ten principles was
commonplace at these seminars. See, e.g., the reports of the seminars held in Baguio City
(Philippines), ST/TAA/HR/2 (1958); Santiago (Chile), ST/TAA/HR/3 (1958); Tokyo
(Japan), ST/TAO/HR/7 (1960); Vienna (Austria), ST/TAO/HR/8 (1960); Wellington
(New Zealand), ST/TAO/HR/1I (1961); Mexico, ST/TAO/HR/12 (1961); Kabul (Afghanistan), ST/TAO/HR/21 (1964); Dakar (Senegal), ST/TAO/HR/25 (1966).
74. Some of the more persuasive pleas for a "minimum standard of justice" include
Wise, Note on International Standards of Criminal Law and Administration, in INTERNATioxAL CRnaiNAL LAW 135-63 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965); Borchard, The "Minimum
Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MicH. L. R:v. 445-61 (1940); A. lNEMMar,
supra note 29, at 497-570. See also Orfield, What Constitutes Fair Criminal Procedure under
Municipal and International Law, 12 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 35-46 (1950).

